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1 Introduction 
According to what can be called the ‘literalist’ conception of speech acts, the semantics of 
(major) morpho-syntactic sentences types — e.g. imperative, declarative and interrogative — 
determines major illocutionary force types — e.g. directive, assertive and question (e.g. 
Sadock & Zwicky, 1985). This conception is at the core of traditional Speech Act Theory (Searle, 
1969, 1975b; Vanderveken, 1990) and threads, under one guise or another, several 
contemporary theories of sentential mood (see Kissine, 2012, 2013; Recanati, 2013 for 
detailed discussions). For instance, authors like Han (2000), Barker (2004), Boisvert & Ludwig 
(2006) or Isac (2015) all posit that the interpretation of the imperative sentence (1) as a 
request, viz. its directive illocutionary force, is determined by the meaning of the imperative 
mood (for a detailed overview, see Jary & Kissine, 2014). 
(1) Close the door. 
Literalist theories bind directive force with the imperative mood, but they do, of course, 
acknowledge that directive speech acts may performed with a non-imperative sentence, as in  
(2)-(4). 
(2) Can you close the door? 
(3) Is it possible to close the door? 
(4) It’s cold in here. 
The simplest analysis is that such requests are indirect, in that they are performed by means 
of, and in addition to the direct speech act encoded by the sentence-type (Searle, 1975a). It is 
plausible that the directive force of (4) inferentially follows from on its being understood as 
assertion that it is cold. However, interpreting (2) as a request is probably not mediated by its 
being understood as a question about the addressee’s ability to open the door. For this reason, 
since the early days of Speech Act Theory, constructions such as (2) were treated as 
conventionalised ways to perform requests (Bach, 1998; Morgan, 1978; Searle, 1975a).  
To insist, according to the literalist view the direct illocutionary force of an utterance 
is determined by the semantics its sentence type. Consequently, conventionalisation of 
indirect request should result in the construction at hand acquiring the directive illocutionary 
force as part of (one of) its encoded meaning(s). This position has been explicitly argued for 
by Sadock (1974) and more recently by Stefanowitsch (2003). Another consequence of 
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literalism, then, is that any request that is non-imperative and non-conventionalised entails 
the derivation of a primary illocutionary force, determined by the utterance sentence-type. 
For instance, the directive interpretation of the conventionalised of (2) should be as direct as 
that of (1). But crucially, any directive interpretation of the non-conventionalised (3), by 
contrast, should necessarily be mediated by the derivation of the force of assertion.1 That is, 
even though under their interrogative interpretation (2) and (3) are semantically very similar, 
since the latter is not a conventionalised indirect request, its directive interpretation should 
necessarily involve the derivation of the interrogative meaning.  
An alternative to literalism consists in defining the encoded meaning of sentence-types 
without invoking illocutionary force, but using semantic features that would predict the kind 
of speech act these sentences are prototypically used to perform (Kissine, 2012, 2013; 
Recanati, 2013). Restricting the discussion to the semantics of imperative sentences, one such 
feature that has been often invoked (under one form or another) to explain their association 
with directive force is potentiality, viz. the fact that the content is neither ruled in nor ruled 
out by the common ground (Davies, 1986; Jary & Kissine, 2016, forthcoming; Kaufmann, 2012, 
pp. 155-157; Kissine, 2013; Wilson & Sperber, 1988). Another important feature is that 
imperative sentences are inherently addressee-oriented, thus not resulting in a predication of 
a property of a subject (Mastop, 2005; Zanuttini, 2008; Zanuttini, Pak, & Portner, 2012).  
Of course, the way these semantic features are implemented, as well as how they are 
said to conspire with the context in order to give rise to a directive reading vary greatly author 
from author. For instance, Kaufmann (2012) assigns a declarative semantics to the imperative 
mood, analysing it as necessity modal, whose use in directive speech acts is explained through 
presupposition mechanisms that result in an unchallengeable update of the common ground. 
In a wholly different framework, Ruytenbeek (2017, chap. 1-2) models both imperative 
sentences and directive speech acts in terms of force dynamics (in the sense of Talmy, 2000). 
In his view, the former correspond to a pattern where only the addressee is represented as 
an agonist of a force interaction, whereas the latter include the speaker as the antagonist 
exerting a force on the addressee, the outcome of this force interaction outcome left 
undetermined. 
Our aim here is obviously not to review and compare different accounts of imperative 
mood (see, for instance, Jary & Kissine, 2014). Rather, we are interested in the different 
predictions non-literalist theories entail relative to the processing of non-imperative requests. 
Since they do not directly include illocutionary forces within sentence-type semantics, 
accounts of this kind are open to the possibility that non-imperative sentences may, on certain 
 
1 Unless, of course, that constructions as (4) are also conventionalised indirect request. Below 




occasions, receive directive force without any other force being activated. More precisely, 
unlike in literalist theories, a non-imperative sentence may receive only the directive 
illocutionary force without the directive interpretation being attached to this sentence by a 
process of conventionalisation. That is, even though the interrogative in (3) is not a 
construction that can to be conventionally associated with directive force, it may nevertheless 
be interpreted without also being interpreted as a question, just like the conventionalised (2). 
This is all the more so, as both (2) and (3) are related to the directive force the same 
‘convention of means’ (REFS): both explicitly evoke the addressee’s ability to carry out the 
requested action (REFS). DVP EN UNE PHRASE. 
 To put it in a slightly different way, in a non-literalist theory of illocutionary force 
processing, a request can be indirect, in the sense of not being prototypically associated with 
directive force, without necessarily being secondary, i.e., without being associated with the 
activation of a non-directive illocutionary force (Kissine, 2013, pp. 111-122; Recanati, 1987, 
pp. 165-167). By contrast, in literalist theories any non-conventional indirect request is 
necessarily secondary. At this stage, then, it becomes clear that these two families of theories 
make diametrically opposite predictions as to the processing of indirect requests. For a non-
literalist, an interrogative sentence, such as (3), may be interpreted as a request without the 
force of questioning be activated. By contrast, literalist theories ought to predict that 
whenever a non-conventionalised interrogative, such as (3), is interpreted as request, the 
interpretation as a question is also activated.  
Non-literalist theories entail another clear empirical prediction. Since the association 
between the imperative sentence-type and directive speech acts is explained by the semantic 
(non-illocutionary) features of the former, it follows that any other sentence with a similar 
semantics should be as readily and directly assigned directive force as imperatives. As just 
mentioned, Ruytenbeek (2017) analyses imperatives as expressing a force exertion on the 
addressee. Interestingly, in cognitive linguistic frameworks, exactly the same analysis could be 
applied to the deontic modals such as (5) (e.g., Sweetser, 1990, pp. 52-54). 
(5) You must close the window. 
Under such a force-dynamic analysis, it makes sense to assume that — just as is the case with 
imperatives — when You must VP is used as a directive, the force exertion pattern is specified 
with the speaker as the source of the force exerted on the addressee. (RAJ UNE FIGURE) 
Accordingly, directives performed with You must VP forms should be as direct as the 
imperative ones. The same prediction follows from Kaufmann’s (2012) semantics of 
imperatives as a necessity modal. She explicitely assumes that imperatives have exactly the 
same semantics as deontic modals in cases like (5), predicting that their favoured 
interpretation is a directive one (a claim initially made by Ninan, 2005). 
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The mechanism underlying the processing of indirect — or rather, non-imperative — 
requests is thus a clear empirical test for the validity of non-literalist conceptions of the 
interface between the pragmatics of illocutionary forces and the semantics of sentence types. 
To repeat, these theories predict, first, that even in non-conventionalised indirect requests 
the directive force may be primary, and, second, that deontic modals are as closely associated 
with directive force as imperatives.  
To the best of our knowledge, these two predictions have never been tested within 
the existing experimental literature on indirect speech acts (see Ruytenbeek, in press; 
Terkourafi, 2009 for a detailed overview). Empirical research carried out in the late seventies 
show that people sometimes answers yes to conventionalised indirect requests for 
information, such as (6), which does suggest that the interrogative meaning is processed at 
some level (Munro 1979, Clark 1979, see also Abbeduto et al. 1989). 
(6) Could you tell me the time? 
However, it is unclear whether in such cases, the request for information is genuinely 
secondary or whether answering yes results from the activation of a formulaic question-
answer pair (in the sense of Conversational analysis (Schegloff REF). Furthermore, studies 
carried out by Gibbs (1979; 1983) provided evidence that understanding expressions such as 
(7)-(8) as indirect requests does not take longer than understanding the same expressions as 
direct questions. In a context that primes directive interpretation, the direct question uses of 
these expressions even took longer than their indirect uses. 
(7) Must you close the window? (meaning “Do not close the window”) 
(8) Can’t you be friendly? (meaning “Please be friendly to other people”) 
It thus plausible that conventional indirect requests may be understood as fast as the 
direct “question” use of the same expression, which has led researchers to conclude that they 
do not entail extra processing costs relative to their direct counterparts (see also Shapiro and 
Murphy (1993). Note, however, that to genuinely draw this conclusion indirect requests 
should be compared to imperatives. More importantly, nothing is known yet as to the 
directive processing of non-conventionalised interrogatives, such as (3) and of directive 
interpretation of deontic modals, such as in (5). In what follows, we report two experiments, 
addressing these questions. 
2 Study 1: Conventionalised vs. non-conventionalised indirect requests 
The aim of our first study is to determine whether a non-conventionalised indirect request 
can be both indirect and primary. If this is the case, the directive interpretation of both 
conventionalised and non-conventionalised indirect request should not differ from that of 
imperative requests. Importantly, imperative and indirect requests should be compared in a 
context that allows both direct and indirect interpretations of the latter, in order to make sure 
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that what is measured are the processing correlates of the choice of an indirect illocutionary 
force and not that of a directive interpretation forced by the context.2 
2.1 Materials 
The studies reported in this paper are carried out in French, and the French equivalents of  (2)-
(3) appear to be perfect candidates of conventionalised and non-conventionalised indirect 
requests: 
  
(9) Pouvez-vous VP? 
Can you VP  
(10) Est-il possible de VP ? 
Is=it possible to VP 
Their literal meaning is very close, and in a context where the only plausible interpretation of 
pouvez and possible is that of an ability modal, almost equivalent. 
However, the only measures of conventionalisation of speech acts available in the 
literature are certain surface properties. For instance, Sadock (1974) and Stefanowitsch (2003) 
argue that the felicity of please or of the vocative someone in Could you VP ? constructions 
reveals that they are conventionally associated with the directive force, in exactly the same 
way as imperative sentences.  
(11) Could you please close the door? 
(12) Could you close the door, someone? 
Unfortunately, such formal criteria are not entirely reliable. On the one hand, some uses of 
the imperative clearly disallow please and someone (Jary & Kissine, 2014, p. 18). 
(13) Be glad that we are leaving, (# please /# someone). 
On the other hand, please and someone are perfectly acceptable in certain non-imperative 
sentence that clearly cannot be classified as conventionalised indirect requests (Davies, 1986, 
p. 21): 
(14) I’d appreciate if you would please be quite. 
(15) The phone is ringing, someone. 
(16) Where are my slippers, someone. 
Instead of relying on surface properties, we used a corpus exploration to ensure that Can 
you VP? and Is it possible VP? in French differ as to their degree of conventionalisation as 
indirect requests. All sentences that contained either the variants of Can you (n=751) or the 
variants of Is it possible (n=89) were selected from the texts dated after 1900 on the French 
written corpus Frantext (see references): 
 
2 In that respect, our study differs from the methodology used by Gibss (REF) who… 
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Variants of Can you constructions: (FAIRE UN TABLEAU AVEC CA) 
Pouvez-vous   Peux-tu   Pourriez-vous   
can-IND.PR.2SG/PL=you can-IND.PR.2SG=you can-COND.PR.2PL=you 
Pourrais-tu 
can-COND.PR.2SG=you 
 Variants of Is it possible construction: 
Est-il possible de   Serait-il possible de      
is-IND.PR.3SG=it possible to is-COND.PR.3SG=it possible to  
Est-il possible que tu/vous   Serait-il possible que tu/vous 
is-IND.PR.3SG=it possible that you-SG/PL is-COND.PR.3SG=it possible that you-SG/PL 
 
Each token was analysed in its context and coded as (a) an indirect request, (b) a genuine 
question or (c) a rhetorical question. For Can you forms directive uses were the most frequent 
(68.4%), followed by direct questions (26%) and rhetorical questions (5.6%), while for Is it 
possible forms the direct questions represented the most frequent use (63%), followed by 
rhetorical questions (22.5%) and directive uses (14.5%). The difference of distribution 
between the two types of forms was statistically significant (χ2(2) = 103.84, p<.0001). The 
results of this corpus search clearly indicate that Can you forms in French are prototypically 
associated with requests, while Is it possible to ones are mostly used in questions. 
 As already mentioned, in order to compare the processing of directive requests of 
these two forms, it is crucial to design a task that does not a priori bias the interpretation 
towards the directive reading. Our task consisted in 24 combinations of an audio presentation 
of a sentence with a video display of a grid containing coloured shapes and, beneath it, two 
buttons, Yes and No. The sentences were of the four following types: 3 6 control imperatives, 
such as (17), 6 control interrogatives, such as (18), 6 Can you VP? interrogatives, such as (19), 
and 6 Is it possible to VP? interrogatives, such as (20). 
(17) Mettez le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle jaune. 
‘Move the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle.’ 
(18) Le cercle rouge est-il à gauche du rectangle bleu ? 
‘Is the red circle on the left of the blue rectangle?’ 
(19) Pouvez-vous mettre le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle jaune ? 
‘Can you move the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle?’ 
 
3 The sentences were spoken by two female native speakers of French and recorded using Praat (version 6021). 
We thank Amandine Colson and Philippine Geelhand de Merxem for their vocal recordings (Experiments 1-2). 
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(20) Est-il possible de mettre le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle jaune ? 
  ‘Is it possible to move the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle?’ 
Control imperatives could be responded to only by moving a shape in the instructed position 
in the grid, while control interrogatives could be responded to only by answering yes and no. 
For all the grids, the two objects referred to by the sentences could only be singled out if both 
their shape and their color were taken into account. Moving a colored shape was “possible” if 
the position in the grid, which was referred to by the sentence, was empty so that the object 
could be moved to that position; it was “impossible” otherwise (this rule was implicit to the 
task). For the imperative sentences, it was always possible to move the shape as indicated in 
the sentence. For all the interrogative sentences, there was an equal number of trials where 
the movement was possible (and the correct answer to the corresponding question was yes) 
and those where it was not (and the correct answer to the corresponding question was no). 
Therefore, it was possible to respond to the sentence by moving the shape only for half of the 
target Can you and Is it possible stimuli. In this way, we ensured that the directive 
interpretation of these sentences did not reflect the fact that no other reading was 
contextually possible. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Figure 1 Example of a screen associated with a sentence. 
The presentation of each sentence was associated with a grid consisting in a different 
arrangement of 8 geometrical shapes (2 triangles, 2 circles, 2 squares, and 2 rectangles) of 4 
possible colors (yellow, red, green, and blue). Each trial consisted in the combination of a 
spoken sentence and a grid. 5 lists were created, in which the order of the 24 trials was 
randomized; the participants were randomly assigned to a list.  
A short training consisted in 4 combinations of a spoken sentence and a grid, involving 
2 explicit performatives such as (21), and interrogatives such as (22). For the explicit 
performative sentences, it was possible to move the shape as indicated in the sentence. For 
one interrogative, the correct answer was yes; for the other one, the correct answer was no. 
(21) Nous vous demandons de mettre le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle
 jaune. 
‘We are asking you to move the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle.’ 
(22) Y a-t-il un cercle rouge dans cette grille ? 




2.2 Participants and procedure 4 
41 students at the Université libre de Bruxelles, native French speakers, participated in the 
experiment in exchange for a payment of 8 € (29 female, mean age = 21.7 years, standard 
deviation = 2.83 years, range = 17–29 years). 6 of them were left-handed, but all of them were 
used to handle the computer mouse with their right hand and they did so during the 
experiment. All the participants had normal hearing, normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
none of them had language disorders. None of them had graduated in linguistics or had 
previous experience with the experimental design. A signed informed consent was obtained 
for each participant.  
The participants were seated in a small office, in front of an ASUS laptop computer 
(screen resolution 1920 x 1080). To present the stimuli, a script was created using Adobe Flash 
with ActionScript 2.0. This script allowed the participants to move the object inside the grid 
or click the yes/no button. It was run in Tobii Studio software (version 3.4.6) as the screen 
recording media element. Five different versions of the script were created, corresponding to 
the five lists of participants. The sentences were presented through Sennheiser MM 550–X 
circumaural headphones. Before the onset of the experiment, each participant underwent a 
calibration procedure. The participants’ eye movements and fixations were measured with a 
Tobii Studio eye-tracker X2–60 (sampling at 60Hz). Mouse clicks and eye movements were 
recorded by Tobii Studio. 
Each trial was initiated by clicking a black circular button in the centre of a blank screen. 
Clicking the button immediately launched the audio file containing a recorded spoken 
sentence. The task for the participants was to listen to each sentence and to respond to it 
either by answering with yes/no or by displacing a shape within the grid. To answer with yes 
or no, they clicked the yes/no buttons at the bottom of the screen. Only one response per 
item was allowed. The participants moved automatically to the next trial after clicking the 
yes/no buttons or after they had dropped a shape in a box of the grid. In all the trials, the grid 
was located in the upper part of the screen, and the yes/no buttons at the bottom, with yes 
on the left and no on the right. The position of the yes and no buttons were not 
counterbalanced. 
Before the onset of the experiment, the participants were presented with the 
instructions on the screen of the computer. First, they were told that the experiment would 
consist in a situation test in which they would interact with a grid and yes/no buttons, and 
that the grid would contain colored geometrical shapes. Next, they were informed that they 
would hear sentences displayed in the headphones and that, for each spoken sentence, a grid 
would be displayed on the screen, with the yes/no buttons at the bottom of the screen. They 
were told to use the buttons to answer with yes or no and, to comply with an instruction, to 
move the shape as indicated by the sentence. They were also told that, for each sentence they 
 
4 The full instructions for this and the next study, as well as the audio files containing the recorded utterances, are 
available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/s9mq8/). 
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would hear, only one response would be allowed (either a yes/no answer or moving a shape). 
They were also asked to avoid making mistakes while trying to respond as fast as possible. 
2.3 Results 
All the reported analyses were carried out with the R software version 3.2.2 for Windows (R 
development core team, 2015). The data for this experiment are available on the Open 
Science Framework (https://osf.io/s9mq8/). All mixed regression models were fitted using the 
lme4 package (Bates and Sarkar 2007). The significance of a factor was tested by comparing a 
model with this factor to a null model that excluded it but had an otherwise identical random 
factor structure. All pairwise post-hoc comparisons were carried out using the lsmeans 
function with Tukey adjustment for multiple comparisons from the lsmeans package (Lenth 
2016).  
First, we assessed whether conventionalised Can you move_? interrogative sentences 
gave rise to more directive interpretations than the non-conventionalised Is it possible to 
move _?. Responses to the spoken sentences were classified into answers (yes or no) and 
moves (moving a shape in the grid). Evidence that an interrogative sentence is interpreted as 
a question (request for information) would be a yes answer to the question expressed. 
Evidence for a directive, “request for action” interpretation of an interrogative would be that, 
upon hearing the sentence, the participant moves the shape as indicated by the sentence 
instead of answering yes to the question. We restricted the analysis to those stimuli for which 
the correct response was yes, and hence, for which it was possible to respond by moving the 
shape mentioned in the sentence. A binomial mixed model, with participant intercept as 
random factor revealed that the number of directive interpretations was higher for 
conventionalised Can you move_? than for non-conventionalised Is it possible to move _? 
interrogative sentences (β= 0.79; z= 2.031; p =0.043; see  about her 
Figure 2).  
Insert Figure 2 about her 
Figure 2 : Responses per sentence type. Only those You can and It is possible sentences for 
which the move response is possible are included. Vertical bars represent standard error. 
Second, we compared response times to different sentences, defined as the length of 
time comprised between the moment when the first colored shape was spoken out in the 
sentence (computed with Audacity 2.0.6 and coded in Tobii Studio) and the mouse click on 
the yes/no buttons (for yes/no answers) or the first mouse click on a shape in the grid (for 
“move in the grid” responses). The mean response times by sentence and response are 
summarised in Figure 3. We built a linear mixed model with slopes and intercepts for 
participant as random factor, and sentence type as predictor; errors (n=59) were excluded. 
The model revealed a significant effect of sentence (Imperative vs. Can vs. Possible vs. 
Interrogative; χ2(3)=52.54, p <0.001), as well as an interaction between the sentence and the 
response (Move vs. Yes-No; χ2(2)=51.92, p <0.001). Post-hoc analyses revealed no difference 
in reaction times between imperatives (β= 2833, 95% CI = [2534; 3133]) and the directive 
10 
 
interpretations (move responses) of Can you (β = 3014, 95% CI = [2400; 3628]) and Is it possible 
sentences (β= 2863, 95% CI = [2255; 3472]; all p’s >0.99). Relative to control interrogatives for 
which the correct response was yes (β=3706, 95% CI = [3235; 4178], reaction times were 
longer for the question interpretation (yes-no responses) of Can you sentences (β = 4719, 95% 
CI = [4187; 5250]; t(52.18)= 3.89, p= 0.006) and of Is it possible sentences (β = 4410, 95% CI = 
[3946, 4874]; t(48.74) = 3.31; p = 0.03). However, there was no difference between the 
question interpretations of Can you and Is it possible sentences (p=0.91). 
 
 
Figure 3 : Responses per sentence and response type. Vertical bars represent standard error. 
Only those Can you, Is it possible and interrogative sentences for which the yes response is 
correct are included. 
Third, we measured the total fixation duration on the area of interest (AOI) 
encompassing the yes and no buttons and the small area in-between. Like for the response 
times measures, the segments started when the first coloured shape was spoken out in the 
sentence and ended as soon as the first left mouse click occurred (either to select a shape or 
to click on the yes/no buttons). Longer fixations on the buttons were interpreted as related to 
the illocutionary force of questioning. As can be seen from Figure 3, control imperatives, and 
directive interpretations of both Can you and Is it possible sentences were associated with 
almost no fixation in AOI yes-no. Additionally linear mixed model, with slopes and intercepts 
for participant as random factor revealed no difference between control interrogatives, and 
interrogative interpretation of Can you and Is it possible sentences (χ2(2)=1.73, p = 0.43).  
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Figure 4: Mean fixation duration on the yes-no buttons per sentence and response type. 
Vertical bars represent standard error. Only those Can you, Is it possible and interrogative 
sentences for which the yes response is correct are included. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
To begin with, conventionalised Can you sentences triggered more directive 
interpretations than the otherwise similar Is it possible sentences. Recall that in the context 
of the task, nothing forced this directive interpretation, which is reflected by the fact that even 
Can you sentences elicited many non-directive interpretations. More importantly, the results 
of Study 1 strongly confirm the predictions made by non-literalist theorises of illocutionary 
force attribution. Judging from response times, directive interpretations of interrogative 
sentences did not seem to be more taxing than that of imperatives, and that independently 
of the conventionalisation parameter. In other words, assigning directive force to a non-
imperative sentence does not seem to require additional processing effort, even if this 
sentence does not instantiate a construction conventionally associated with requests. In fact, 
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conventionalised indirect request may even introduce some structural ambiguity: interpreting 
Can you and Is it possible as a question when a directive interpretation is available is more 
taxing, as evidence by higher reaction times relative to control interrogatives. Third, fixation 
measures confirmed that in such cases, requests are indirect but primary. Fixation to the yes-
no area is clearly linked to the interpretation of the sentence as a question, and no so such 
fixation was evidenced for imperatives and for the directive interpretations of Can you and Is 
it possible alike.  
3 Study 2: imperatives vs. modals 
As evoked in the Introduction, non-literalist theories explain the close association 
between directive speech acts and imperative sentences by the semantic structure of the 
former. Accordingly, directive force should also be the privileged interpretation of a non-
imperative structure whose semantics shares with imperatives those features that render 
their directive interpretation salient. More particularly, we saw that several non-literalist 
theories predict that deontic modal sentences, such as (5), should be as direct a request as 
the corresponding imperative. 
 We thus expect that You must VP sentences, such as (23), should receive a directive 
interpretation to the same extent and in the same way as the corresponding imperative, e.g. 
(24). In that they should differ from declaratives with can/may (25) or it is possible (26) which 
can be interpreted both as a statement — just as a control declarative, e.g. (27) — and, 
perhaps less straightforwardly, as indirect requests. 
(23) Vous devez mettre le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle jaune. 
 ‘You must put the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle.’ 
(24) Mettez le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle jaune. 
‘Move the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle.’ 
(25) Vous pouvez mettre le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle jaune. 
 ‘You can/may move the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle.’ 
(26) Il est possible de mettre le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle jaune. 
  ‘It is possible to move the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle.’ 
(27) Le cercle rouge est à gauche du rectangle bleu. 
‘The red circle is on the left of the blue rectangle.’ 
The hallmark of statements is being amenable to truth-valuation. The task we used to test our 
hypothesis is thus identical to that in Study 1, except that this time the alternative to moving 
a shape was to click on a true or a false button. 
3.1 Materials 
We created 24 French test sentences: 3 You must, 3 control imperatives, and 6 You 
can/may, 6 It is possible and 6 control declaratives. Like in Experiment 1, the audio 
presentation of each sentence was associated with a grid consisting in a different arrangement 
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of 8 colored geometrical shapes, accompanied, on the lower part of the screen, by two 
buttons TRUE and FALSE. As in Study 2, it is important not to bias the context towards a 
directive interpretation. For this reason, for all types of items, except the imperative and the 
You must sentences, there was an equal number of trials that could be responded to by true 
and by false. For the imperative and You must sentences, it was always possible to move the 
shape as indicated in the sentence. 5 lists were created, in which the order of the 24 trials 
was randomized; the participants were randomly assigned to a list. 
 
3.2 Participants and procedure 
40 students at the Université libre de Bruxelles, native French speakers, participated in the 
experiment in exchange for a payment of 5 € (28 female, mean age = 21.4 years, standard 
deviation = 2.7 years, range = 17-28 years). 4 of them were left-handed, but all of them were 
used to handle the computer mouse with their right hand and they did so during the 
experiment. All participants had normal hearing, normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
none of them had language disorders. None of them had graduated in linguistics or had 
previous experience with this experimental design. A signed informed consent was obtained 
for each participant.  
The procedure was identical to that of Study 1, with the exception that the yes/no 
button was replaced by a true/false button. A short training consisted in 4 combinations of a 
spoken sentence and a grid, involving 2 explicit performatives, such as (28), and 2 declaratives, 
such as (29). The correct response to one of the training declaratives, was true and false for 
the other one. 
(28) Nous vous demandons de mettre le cercle rouge à gauche du rectangle
 jaune. 
‘We are asking you to move the red circle to the left of the yellow rectangle.’ 
(29) Il y a un cercle rouge dans cette grille. 
 ‘There is a red circle in this grid.’ 
Because there was only one possible interpretation for each training sentence, the 
participants’ responses could not be biased either towards the direct statement or towards 
the indirect directive interpretation of the utterances used later on in the experiment. 
3.3 Results 
As can be seen from Figure 5, You must sentences elicited almost only directive 
interpretations, viz. move responses. By contrast, in those You can and It is possible sentence 
for which this response was possible (hence for the assertive meaning of which true was the 
correct answer), interpretation as statements was dominant. A linear mixed model with 
participant intercept as random factor revealed an effect of sentence (χ2(2) = 216.91, 
p<.0001). As expected, You must sentences prompted significantly less true-false responses 
(β= -3.33, 95% CI [-4.32; -2.34] than You you (β = 1.19, 95% CI [0.49; 1.89; z=-8.11, p<.0001) 
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and It is possible sentences (β = 2.52, 95% CI [1.66; 3.38]; z=-8.994, p<.0001). Additionally, You 
can sentences prompted less true-false responses than It is possible ones (z=-3.29, p = .0028). 
Response patterns thus confirm that You must sentences receive almost an exclusively 
directive interpretation. In the subsequent analyses, which focus on processing correlates, we 
exclude the true/false responses to You must (n=21), along with true/false responses to 
imperatives (n=9) and other errors (n = 18) 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
Figure 5: Responses per sentence type. Only those You can and It is possible sentences for 
which the move response is possible are included. Vertical bars represent standard error. 
 Next, we compared reaction times between imperatives, declaratives, You must and 
those It is possible and You can sentences for which a move response was possible (see Figure 
6). As in Study 1, response times were computed from the length of time comprised between 
the moment when the first coloured shape was spoken out in the sentence. 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
Figure 6: Response times per sentence type and response. Vertical bars represent standard 
error. Only those You can, It is possible and declarative sentences for which the true 
response is correct are included. 
A linear mixed model with participant slopes and intercepts as random factors revealed 
significant effect of sentence (χ2(4)= 44.41, p<.0001), as well as an interaction of Sentence and 
response (χ2(2)= 30.48, p<.0001). Response times for You must sentences (β = 3122, 95% 
[2759; 3484]) did not differ from imperatives (β = 2956, 95% CI [2615; 3297], p > .99), and 
from move responses to You can (β = 3146, 95% CI [2590; 3701], p = 1) and It is possible 
sentences (β = 3495, 95% CI [2725; 4264], p = .092). In addition, there was no difference 
between move responses to You can and It is possible and between imperatives (all ps >.09). 
As for true-false responses, the only marginally significant difference was that between true-
false responses to You can sentences (β = 4648, 95% CI [4222; 5074]) and control declaratives 
for which the response was yes [β = 3892, 95% CI [3474; 4312], t(50.87)=3.7, p=.0195; all other 
ps > 0.3). 
 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
Figure 7: Mean fixation duration on the true-false buttons per sentence and response type. 
Vertical bars represent standard error. Only those You can, It is possible and declarative 
sentences for which the true response is correct are included. 
Finally, Figure 7 displays the total fixation duration on the true-false buttons. Virtually 
no such fixation was evidenced for imperatives, You must sentences and directive 




Results of Study 2 further support non-literalist models of illocutionary force attribution. First, 
conforming to the predictions, deontic You must sentences are assigned directive force to 
virtually the same extent and in the same primary way as imperatives. Second, You can and It 
is possible declaratives are sometimes interpreted as a requests, even though the context 
does not mandate this directive interpretation. As in Study 1, such interpretations do not 
entail longer processing or fixations on the true-false area, which would be indicative of the 
activation of the assertive force. That is, we confirmed that a request can be indirect but 
primary. Finally, You can declaratives trigger more directive readings that It is possible ones. 
One of the most salient reading of the French pouvoir (can) is that of a permission. Even 
though the status of permission relative to other directive speech act is somehow special (e.g. 
Jary & Kissine, 2014, pp. 64-65), it is understandable that granting permission may sometimes 
be interpreted as a reason to act. Interestingly, the non-directive interpretation of You can 
sentence seems slightly costlier than that of control declaratives, suggesting a possible 
interference of the directive force.  
4 General discussion 
 A widely held view in contemporary semantics and philosophy of language is that 
sentence structure encodes an illocutionary force component. According to this “literalist” 
view, the three major English sentence-types, such as the imperative, are associated at the 
semantic level with an illocutionary force, such as a directive. What the processing models 
based on these literalist theories have in common is the prediction that the interpretation of 
any utterance of an interrogative or declarative sentence should activate the illocutionary 
force of questioning or asserting, respectively. To date, however, there has been little 
discussion of empirical evidence relevant to the validity of literalism. 
The two studies reported in this paper strongly support non-literalist models, 
according to which illocutionary forces are not encoded within the semantics of sentence 
types. We showed that conventionalization was not required for an interrogative sentence to 
be interpreted as a request, without the question meaning being activated. That is, we 
confirmed that both conventional (Can you_?) and non-conventional (Is it possible_?) are not 
be secondary, as directive interpretations of interrogatives Can you_? and Is it possible_? — 
or, for that matter, of declaratives You can_ and It is possible_ — do not elicit longer reaction 
times than corresponding imperatives. In addition, indirect directive interpretations are not 
associated with fixations on Yes/ No (Study 1) or True/False (Study 2) buttons that would have 
constituted evidence of the activation of a non-directive force.  
Importantly, this effect cannot be assigned to a contextual bias, as our experiments 
were structured in a way that did not favor directive interpretations. In that respect, our 
experimental paradigms constitutes a major improvement over previous experimental studies 
that draw a binary distinction is drawn between the contexts that prime the indirect vs. their 
direct illocutionary force (REFs). This design thus allows insights into the processing correlates 




Our results thus show that indirect interpretations of interrogative and declarative 
sentences do not require the activation of the questioning or assertive force. As such, they 
provide support that to theories that conceive of the relationship between sentence types 
and the speech acts they are prototypically associated of in terms of arrays of semantic 
features that make the former particularly suited for the latter. While our paper does not 
directly address the issue of the semantic features that required for making directive force 
salient, we do provide one empirical indication in that direction. In our Study 2, we confirmed 
that directive illocutionary force is the prototypically associated not only with imperatives, but 
also with second person deontic modals. Directive interpretations of deontic modal sentences 
of the form You must_ appear to be as natural as for the corresponding imperatives, and 
entirely similar in terms of reaction times. This is not to say, of course, that deontic modals 
are entirely closed to an assertoric reading. In the following examples, from Jary and Kissine 
(PAGES), the privileged interpretation seems to be one of an assertion about the addressee 
deontic obligation.  
(30) A:  Jesus can save you...but you must believe it!  All you have to do is accept 
him as your saviour and learn from his teachings...only that way will you be saved in 
the coming end...you must listen!..  




To be sure, in the design of our Study 2, this kind of assertive interpretation was more difficult 
to come by. The point, however, is neither that non-directive interpretation of deontic modals 
is impossible nor that their semantics is indistinguishable from that of modals. What our 
results do indicate is that imperatives and deontic modals have a sufficiently similar semantic 
structure to make their directive interpretation equally natural. In other words, directive force 
can be directly associated with non-imperative sentence forms. 
Finally, results associated with conventional indirect requests provide further evidence 
for a non-literalist conception of illocutionary forces. Both corpus-based validation of the test 
items of Study 1 and behavioural results confirmed that construction such as Can you _? are 
clearly conventionalised for the performance of directive speech acts. Recall that it is 
customary to see think of Can you _? constructions as meaning-form pair, conventionally 
associated with the directive force (Stefanowitsch, 2003). At a first glance, this position seems 
supported by the fact that the reaction time of directive interpretations of Can you_? 
sentences were indistinguishable from those elicited by the imperatives, as well as the 
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absence of fixations towards the yes-now area, associated with the activation of the 
compositional, question meaning. However, in a context that did not prime the directive 
interpretation, Can you VP? sentences gave rise to more question than directive 
interpretation, which may be somehow problematic for such a position. In addition, directive 
interpretations non-conventionalized constructions Is it possible to_? or It is possible to_ were 
behaviorally identical to those of the conventionalized Can you _? sentences. 
In fact, non-directive, question interpretations of Can you_? appeared costlier, as they 
were associated with longer reaction times than control interrogative, for which no directive 
interpretation was possible. Terkourafi and Villavicencio (2003) argue that conventionalized 
indirect requests are by-default associated the default directive illocutionary force. Recall, 
however, that non-directive interpretations of It is possible_? also elicited longer reaction 
times relative to control interrogatives, and that the same holds for non-directive 
interpretations of You can_ and It is possible_ relative to control declaratives. Therefore, if 
non-directive interpretations is, in fact, more accessible — despite a neutral context —, it 
source should not be sought within patterns of conventionalization of particular constructions 
— of ‘meaning-form’ pairs, but rather at the level of conventions of means. ELABORATE HERE. 
If so, directive force is perhaps associated, by default, to a certain types of contents. 
This, however, is very different from including it within the semantics of a sentence type. 
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